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Even when the exchange-rate plays no expenditure-switching role, countries may wish to have flexible
exchange rates in order to free the domestic interest rate as a stabilization tool. In a setting with nontraded
goods, exchange-rate movements may also enhance international risk sharing.
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and NBER
obstfeld@econ.berkeley.eduThe beauty of economics as an intellectual pursuit is its position at the
intersection of formal theory, statistical analysis, and human events ￿ cou-
pled with its ultimate potential to improve peoples￿everyday lives. A master
economist must assume away the distracting inessential details of a situation
in the interest of mathematical clarity. At the same time, he or she must see
how relevant subtleties may a⁄ect the interpretation of data and the applica-
bility of di⁄erent models in real life. Because the ultimate policy decisions
at stake are so complex, with such vast potential to do harm or good in the
world, economics (and especially macroeconomics) is perpetually unsettled,
subject to constant questioning and reassessment. Guillermo Calvo must
be ranked as one of the great masters of economics, and one of the most
unsettling. Time and again, starting with his classic work on the dynamic
inconsistency problem, he has uncovered the hidden crux of a major scienti￿c
issue and forced the profession to rethink conventional beliefs.
One area that has undergone extensive rethinking of late is the classic
Milton Friedman case for exchange-rate ￿ exibility, according to which ￿ oat-
ing exchange rates are helpful in cushioning national economies from real
idiosyncratic shocks. Paradoxically, one in￿ uential assault on the Friedman
case originates in the idea that the pass-through of exchange-rate changes to
domestic prices may be high, another in the idea that pass-through may be
very low.
According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002), one factor behind the reluctance
of emerging markets to allow large swings in nominally ￿￿ oating￿exchange
rates is a relatively rapid pass-through of those swings to consumer prices.
Rapid pass-though of this kind has two implications. Exchange-rate changes
will have a greater potential in the short run to a⁄ect domestic in￿ ation,
and thereby to impede the pursuit of an in￿ ation target. At the same time,
rapid pass-though to all the prices consumers face blunts the exchange rate￿ s
impact on international relative prices, and thereby reduces its potential
expenditure-switching e⁄ects. On both counts, the costs of exchange-rate
volatility are higher in emerging markets compared with the bene￿ts that
Friedman claimed.
Another way the expenditure-switching e⁄ects of the exchange rate can
be eliminated is if there is zero pass-through￿ both to domestic and import
prices. This is the polar opposite of the case that Calvo and Reinhart em-
phasize, but it would prevail if domestic producers and foreign producers of
a country￿ s imports both were to preset their prices in terms of the local
currency. Devereux and Engel (2003) analyze a formal model that includes
1this type of local-currency pricing. They show that in their model, welfare-
maximizing monetary policies may entail ￿xed exchange rates. This theoreti-
cal analysis is viewed as a major challenge to the Friedman case, and one that
is applicable to industrial rather than emerging economies.1 A foreign-based
exporter presetting its price in an emerging-market currency would implicitly
be acquiring a contingent asset denominated in that currency while issuing
a contingent liability denominated in goods. This practice would therefore
contradict the observation of ￿original sin,￿ which restricts emerging bor-
rowers to issuing liabilities indexed to international currencies.2 As a result,
local-currency pricing of imports is not expected to characterize emerging
economies.
The modest goal of the present paper is to reinstate Friedman￿ s case in the
industrial-country setting while retaining the Devereux-Engel local-currency
pricing framework.3 A minor modi￿cation of their model￿ the introduction
of nontraded goods￿ is enough to restore the need for exchange ￿ exibility,
even when all shocks are real. In my modi￿ed model, exchange rate changes
still have absolutely no expenditure-switching e⁄ects in goods markets. They
are necessary, however, to allow countries to pursue independent interest-rate
policies in a world of international capital mobility. That is, the rationale
for exchange ￿ exibility does not necessarily originate in goods markets, as in
Friedman, but in asset markets. Divergent interest-rate movements may be
needed needed, in turn, to support the divergent consumption movements
implied by idiosyncratic national technology shocks in the presence of non-
traded goods. Exchange-rate movements can also enhance risk sharing when
there are nontraded goods. A by-product of my argument is an analysis of
equilibria and optimal policies in terms of interest-rate rather than money-
supply rules ￿ instead, the money supply is endogenous below.
1See Engel (2002) for further discussion. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000) argue that while
the industrial-country retail or consumer prices of imports indeed appear sticky in domestic
currency, wholesale import prices do exhibit some exchange-rate pass-through.
2Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). Calvo and Reinhart (2002) identify the wide-
spread foreign-currency denomination of liabilities as another key factor behind ￿fear of
￿ oating.￿
3After writing this paper, I learned that Duarte (2004) had independently made essen-
tially the same point about the need for exchange-rate ￿ exibility (albeit in a somewhat
di⁄erent setting). See also Duarte and Obstfeld (2004). These two papers are based on
money-supply rather than nominal interest rate policy feedback rules. On some implica-
tions of this di⁄erence, see footnote 7 below.
21 The Model
I adopt the basic setup outlined by Devereux and Engel (2003) but modify
it in two ways. First, I model monetary policy as a choice of the nomi-
nal interest rate (rather than a monetary aggregate) by the central bank.
Second, and more importantly, I introduce nontraded goods in order to illus-
trate the scope for an independent interest-rate policy in the Devereux-Engel
local-currency pricing (LCP) framework. What is the intuition for this last
e⁄ect? With nontraded goods and ￿ exible prices, a national productivity
shock has a disproportionate e⁄ect on Home consumption, introducing an ex
post asymmetry between the countries. To mimic this response under sticky
prices￿ thereby achieving the best possible (second-best) ex post allocation￿
authorities must apply a disproportionate interest-rate stimulus in Home.
The basic setup of the model is as follows.
There are two (ex ante) symmetrical countries, Home and Foreign. Each
country produces a continuum of tradable goods (Home￿ s indexed by [0,1),
Foreign￿ s by [1,2]) and a continuum of nontradable goods (indexed by [0,1]).
Each Home representative agent is an atomistic yeoman producer of one
di⁄erentiated tradable good i and one di⁄erentiated nontradable good i, and














where C is a consumption index, L is labor supply, ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1).
Because of the assumption that the monetary instrument is the nominal
interest rate, and that the money supply adjusts endogenously, there is no
need to model explicitly the demand for money (see Woodford 2003), and I
will assume that any money-demand e⁄ects on welfare are negligibly small.
A critical assumption in the model is that of market segmentation between
Home and Foreign. A Home producer of tradables can practice third-degree
price discrimination, charging distinct same-currency prices in the Home and
Foreign markets. By assumption, Home and Foreign consumers (who are
also producers of other goods) face prohibitively high costs of arbitraging
the resulting international price di⁄erentials.
Let Wt be nominal marketable wealth at the start of period t; Pt the
nominal price of consumption during the period, Tt transfer payments from
4Foreign producer i supplies tradable 1 + i and nontradable i.
3the government, and Rt+1 the nominal ex post return on the agent￿ s portfolio.
Furthermore, let Yj(i) be the level of output that Home producer i supplies
to the Home tradables market (j = h) and to the Home nontradables market
(j = n); let Pj (i) be the corresponding domestic-currency price charged. To
the Foreign market Home producer i supplies Y ￿
h (i) at Foreign-currency price
P ￿
h(i) Then the ￿ ow budget constraint for producer i is
Wt+1(i) ￿ (1 + Rt+1(i))Wt(i)




h,t(i) + Pn,t(i)Yn,t(i) + Tt ￿ PtCt(i); (1)
where E is the Home-currency price of Foreign currency (the nominal ex-
change rate). There are isomorphic intertemporal maximization problems
for the Foreign agents (whose supplies are denoted by asterisks).
To maximize utility each producer must grasp the nature of Home and
Foreign demand, which depend in turn on the form of the consumption in-
dex. As in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000), overall consumption depends on



























with substitution elasticity ￿.5 Based on these assumptions, demands for the










































5For j = f, the integration is over the interval [1,2].
4The exact price indexes entering the price indexes that Home consumers face


























; j = f.
There are complete markets in claims on future money payments. As
in Backus and Smith (1993), and given the ex ante symmetry of the two












in all dates and states, where C￿ is Foreign consumption and P ￿ is the Foreign
price level measured in Foreign currency. Since purchasing power parity need
not hold ex post in this model, the preceding condition does not generally
equalize marginal utilities of consumption internationally.
Production functions for every variety are given by













in Foreign, so that A and A￿ are economy-wide productivity shocks. Letting
lower-case letters (except for interest rates) denote natural logarithms, I write
the stochastic processes followed by the productivity shocks as







where ￿ 2 [0;1] and the shocks u and u￿ are normally distributed with means
of zero and a common variance of ￿2
u.
Finally, the economy￿ s nominal anchor is provided by the nominal interest-
rate setting rule followed by the central bank,





5where it is the nominal interest earned between dates t and t + 1. Foreign￿ s
central bank has a corresponding rule,
log(1 + i
￿
t) = ￿ +  p
￿





It would be possible, in general, to add ￿noise￿to these reactions functions
by positing that central banks observe with error some of the variables to
which they respond. But I will not pursue that generalization at this stage.
2 The Flexible-Price Equilibrium
Consider next the model￿ s equilibrium when all prices are ￿ exible and the
central banks do not respond to productivity innovations (that is, the ￿ coef-
￿cients in the interest-rate rules are all zero). Under ￿ exible-prices, producers
set domestic-money prices at a ￿xed gross markup, ￿=(￿ ￿ 1), over nominal
marginal cost (equal to W=A in Home and W ￿=A￿ in Foreign), where W and
W ￿ are the Home and Foreign nominal wage rates. Using the conditions for









along with the price-index de￿nitions, one can derive the ￿ ex-price levels of































Observe that C = C￿ always in the ￿ ex-price equilibrium when all goods are
tradable (i.e., when ￿ = 1). But the equality need not hold when ￿ < 1.
In the latter case, a country￿ s ￿ ex-price consumption depends disproportion-
ately on its own productivity shock. The reason is simple: that shock a⁄ects
the nontradable as well as the tradable sector.
The formulas in eq. (7) suggest already that a di⁄erential response of
national interest rates to global and national productivity shocks￿ and hence,
exchange-rate ￿ exibility￿ will be necessary under sticky prices to mimic the
￿ exible-price consumption responses to productivity shocks.
Using the price-index de￿nitions and eq. (6), one can also establish that












6Thus, despite discriminatory price setting, in this ￿ exible-price setting con-
sumers in Home and Foreign face the same international relative prices in
equilibrium, and the global allocation of resources is e¢ cient (subject to the
nontradability of nontradable goods). Of course, Pn = Ph, and similarly in
Foreign.
Equilibrium real interest rates must be consistent with the path of ex-
pected consumption growth described by eqs. (3) and (7). Nominal interest
rates and the resulting path for the overall money price level must, in turn,
be consistent with the required path of equilibrium real interest rates.
Nominal interest rates have their relevant impact on the economy through













(There is a parallel equation for Foreign.) Taking logs of the preceding equal-
ity and noting that consumption is lognormally distributed, I derive











The variances above are endogenous, but because they will be constant over
time, it is simple to compute them once we have solutions for the equilibrium
levels of c and p in terms of current shocks and the means and variances of
future variables. After substituting the policy rule (4) for log(1 + it) above,






1 +  
￿s+1￿t


















Above, consumption can be expressed in terms of the underlying technology
shocks using eq. (7), allowing one to compute directly the equilibrium values
of ￿2
c, ￿2
p;and ￿cp. I will carry out the analogous calculation for the sticky-
price case, and therefore omit it here. At this point I observe only that higher
current and expected future consumption growth rates are associated with
a higher price level today. The reason is that higher consumption growth
requires higher real interest rates. A higher price level raises the real interest
rate through a policy channel￿ a higher nominal interest rate￿ and through
7a lowering of in￿ ation expectations. Once the nominal price levels P and
P ￿ are determined, nominal wages and the nominal exchange rate, which is
given by E = W=W ￿ in this model, are likewise pinned down.
3 The Model with Preset Nominal Prices
In the sticky-price version of the model, producers of tradables set their
domestic and export prices a period in advance of sales, and must meet all
demand that materializes at that price. Prices can be rest fully after one
period, but again must be maintained for a period thereafter. Exporters
set prices in the currency of the purchaser￿ there is local-currency pricing
(LCP) as in Devereux and Engel (2003). Nontradables producers simply set
prices in their respective domestic currencies. While these price dynamics
would be oversimpli￿ed for many purposes, they do allow us to consider
the qualitative stabilization roles of interest and exchange rates in a usefully
transparent setting.
Let￿ s consider the price-setting problem of a generic Home producer i who
sets prices for date t on date t￿1. Because the decision has no repercussions
beyond date t, we may imagine that the producer chooses prices Ph,t, P ￿
H,t,







subject to eq. (1),
Lt(i) =
Yh,t(i) + Yf,t(i) + Yn,t(i)
At
;












































8In performing this maximization the atomistic producer takes macro quan-
tities and price indexes (not indexed by i above) as given.
Because all domestic prices are preset and, I assume, known as of date








(I am making an assumption of common knowledge on the part of price
setters.) All producers are symmetric, so Ct(i) = Ct in equilibrium, for all i,


















































￿ = Ph;t: (12)
The second equality in eq. (11) above is derived using eq. (2). These three
pricing equations have isomorphic counterparts for Foreign producers.









(Recall that PF;t is preset, in domestic-currency terms, by Foreign exporters












The pricing formulas, eqs. (10)￿ (12), also yield useful information about























































































































(with a parallel solution for Etc￿
t+1). This expression is critical ingredient
in the welfare analysis of monetary policies, because it contributes (via the
consumption Euler equation, eq. (8)) to the contemporaneous innovation in
consumption, ct, and hence to the variance of consumption and its covariance
with technology shocks. In the present setting the overall price level is known
a period in advance, so the log of the Euler eq. (8) is












To solve for the price level now, substitute the interest-rate rule, eq. (4),
into eq. (16), and take date t￿1 expectations to derive a di⁄erence equation
for pt = Et￿1pt;
pt =
1
1 +  
￿
Et￿1pt+1 + ￿(Et￿1ct+1 ￿ Et￿1ct) ￿
￿








10I am now allowing the ￿ coe¢ cients in the interest-rate rule to di⁄er from
zero, but because the price level for date t is determined a period earlier, the
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￿s+1￿t












This is the natural extension of eq. (9) to the case in which pt is a function
only of information dated t￿1 or earlier. Using eqs. (3) and (15) to substitute
for the expected consumption terms above, one ￿nds that
pt =
￿￿(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)





















A complete solution of the model requires an expression for realized con-
sumption, ct, in terms of the date-t shocks. That expression, in turn, allows
computation of the equilibrium values of the key moments ￿2
c; ￿cu;and ￿cu￿:























t) + ￿; (18)
where ￿ is a function only of date t ￿ 1 (or earlier) information.
Equations (7) and (18) disclose the key di⁄erence in consumption dy-
namics between the ￿ exible and ￿xed-price cases. In the ￿ exible-price case,
assuming that ￿H = ￿￿
H = 0, the responses of consumption to technology














With sticky prices, however, eq. (18) shows that the responses of consump-
tion are muted whenever ￿ < 1. Why? For ￿ = 1; technology follows a
random walk and so does log consumption; according to eq. (16), current
consumption therefore can adjust fully with no change in the real rate of
interest. When ￿ < 1, however, consumption is mean-reverting and current
consumption can adjust to its ￿ ex-price level only if the real interest rate
falls. In the ￿ exible-price case, pt indeed does fall, creating a lower real inter-
est rate both through higher expected in￿ ation and through the associated
policy-induced fall in the nominal interest rate it. In contrast, if pt is rigid
in the short run, the required real interest rate response is muted and so is
11the rise in ct: By appropriate choice of the policy response coe¢ cients ￿H
and ￿￿
H in eq. (4), however, the central bank can induce the full ￿ ex-price
consumption responses, and I show below that it will wish to do so.
That result also holds in the Devereux-Engel (2003) model with no non-
traded goods, as the authors show. Because ￿ = 1 in their setting, however,
￿ ex-price consumption responses to technology shocks are symmetrical, and
so central banks￿policy responses are absolutely symmetrical as well. That
is not the case when ￿ < 1; for then, a relatively more forceful Home interest
rate intervention is needed to mimic the ￿ exible-price consumption response.
Variable international interest-rate di⁄erentials imply exchange-rate varia-
tion, however, even though the exchange rate has no expenditure switching
e⁄ects between Home and Foreign goods in this model.
As a last step before a formal welfare analysis of policy rules, I derive the
endogenous covariances entering into the model. To simplify the algebra, let

































































The expressions involving Foreign consumption c￿ are analogous but involve
the Foreign interest-rate policy coe¢ cients, ￿f and ￿￿
f. Those coe¢ cients
do not enter the Home covariances because of the highly insulating role of
exchange rate changes in this particular LCP setting. Exchange rate changes
merely facilitate independent monetary policies in a world of international
capital mobility.
124 Welfare and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules































































Using eq. (13) and the Foreign analog of eq. (14) to eliminate the relative


































































































































I have already noted that the distribution of Foreign consumption, C￿,
does not depend on the Home interest-rate rule. Therefore, in considering
Home￿ s optimal interest-rate rule, I need only consider maximization of the
￿rst summand in the last equation with respect to the feedback coe¢ cients
￿H and ￿￿














































Equations (20)￿ (22) imply that
V / (2 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
 ￿


























































1 +   ￿ ￿
￿
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1 +   ￿ ￿
￿
:
A comparison of eqs. (18) and (19) reveals that these policy responses
yield a response of consumption to innovations in technology that is identical
to the ￿ ex-price response. They make the variance of consumption equal to
its ￿ ex-price variance, and induce the ￿ ex-price covariances with the shocks
to technology. But interest-rate intervention alone cannot bring the world
economy to the ￿ ex-price consumption levels. Policy optimization thus yields
a strictly second-best allocation, with welfare below the ￿ exible-price level.
In particular, as Devereux and Engel (2003) note, consumers will in general
face the wrong relative prices in the preset-price equilibrium, prices that do
not re￿ ect true levels of relative economic scarcity.
6It is easily veri￿ed that these coe¢ cients also maximize the equal-weights ￿world
planner￿welfare function 1
2U + 1
2U￿, as Devereux and Engel (2003) also ￿nd. Thus, the
Nash equilibrium in a policy-rule setting game between the countries is e¢ cient￿ there is
no coordination failure in this model, though that is a model-speci￿c result (Obstfeld and
Rogo⁄ 2002, Benigno and Benigno 2003). It may also be checked that at this optimum,
the value that   (the response to the price level) takes in (0;1) is irrelevant for welfare.
That is, the optimal choice of the ￿ coe¢ cients fully o⁄sets any welfare e⁄ect of  :
145 The Need for Exchange-Rate Flexibility
A key point about the preceding second-best interest-rate rules is that they
predict asymmetric national responses to technology shocks￿ except in the
special case of no nontradables (￿ = 1) that Devereux and Engel analyze. A
useful way to think about this asymmetry is to de￿ne the mutually orthogonal








Then one can express the second-best interest-rate rules for Home and For-
eign, respectively, in the simple forms




1 +   ￿ ￿
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1 +   ￿ ￿
￿




1 +   ￿ ￿
￿
ud;t:
The countries respond identically to the global shock in all cases, but have
oppositely signed responses to the idiosyncratic shock when there are non-
tradable goods and, consequently, ￿ < 1: I noted the intuition for this result
in the introduction: when ￿ = 1; productivity shocks in either country have
perfectly symmetrical consumption e⁄ects in the ￿ ex-price equilibrium, so
internationally symmetrical interest-rate responses always su¢ ce to induce
the ￿ ex-price response to any shock. That is, when all goods are tradable, it
is optimal for central banks to respond only to global shocks and to respond
with equal interest-rate changes. Nontradables change this. Because a do-
mestic technology shock has a stronger e⁄ect on domestic than on foreign
consumption, a relatively more forceful domestic interest-rate response may
be required.
This asymmetry has implications for exchange rates, because, given an
interest-rate parity condition, divergent interest-rate movements will call for
exchange-rate changes. To see this formally, observe that the Home and




















15After taking logs, substituting the optimal interest-rate rules, the interna-
tional risk-sharing condition, and the equations for ex post consumption
levels, one concludes that, apart from additive constants, the log exchange
rate under optimal monetary policies is given by




1 +   ￿ ￿
￿
ud;t +
2(1 ￿ ￿) 
1 +  
￿
 ￿




1 +  
:
This expression makes it clear that idiosyncratic technology shocks will in-
duce exchange-rate movements through the asymmetric response of consump-
tion, something that does not occur in this model when ￿ = 1 and all goods
are tradable.7
It is not an expenditure-switching function of exchange rates in com-
modity markets that gives them a role in optimal second-best monetary
policies. Instead, the rationale for exchange-rate ￿ exibility lies in the asset
markets. Exchange-rate adjustment makes room for expenditure-changing
interest-rate policies, and they do so by o⁄setting the incipient expected
return di⁄erentials that divergent interest-rate movements would otherwise
cause. Exchange-rate movements can also enhance risk sharing. To enjoy
the bene￿ts of both activist monetary policy and open capital markets, gov-
ernments must allow the exchange rate to move.
7Notice from the exchange-rate equation that even when ￿ = 1; and productivity shocks
therefore are permanent, the exchange rate will move in response to ad;t = ad;t￿1 + uD,t.
When ￿ = 1, the di⁄erence equation governing the exchange rate reduces to the simpler
form
et =
2(1 ￿ ￿) 
1 +  
ad;t +
Etet+1
1 +  
;
which has the standard no-bubbles solution. The exchange rate can change even at an
unchanged international interest-rate di⁄erential because relative money supplies adjust
endogenously, essentially to mimic the monetary rule given by Duarte and Obstfeld (2004).
In the case ￿ = 1, as shown earlier, there is no need for an interest-rate change to produce
the ￿ exible-price response of consumption. The latter is automatic. Because overall con-
sumer price levels are rigid, however, a globally asymmetric consumption response implies
that an exchange rate change is still needed to maintain the Backus-Smith risk sharing
conditions.
In the Devereux-Engel (2003) paper all shocks are permanent. In the absence of an
appropriate feedback policy rule, however, consumption responses may not equal ￿ exible-
price responses, in contrast to the ￿nding of the present paper. The reason: it is the
money supply rather than the nominal interest rate that is the policy intsrument in the
analysis of Devereux and Engel, and the endogenous adjustment of the interest rate, given
money supplies, in￿ uences the size of the consumption response.
166 Conclusion
Even when the exchange rate plays no expenditure-switching role, as is true
in the model of Devereux and Engel (2003), countries may wish to have
￿ exible exchange rates in order to free the domestic interest rate as a sta-
bilization tool. This can be true even when all shocks are real. Why does
no need for exchange ￿ exibility arise in the Devereux-Engel model with ex-
clusively tradable goods? There, national consumptions move in a perfectly
synchronized fashion when all shocks are real, whether prices are ￿ exible or
preset. Optimal monetary policy simply raises the sticky-price consumption
response to its ￿ exible-price level, a job that can be accomplished through
globally symmetric monetary policies that maintain asset-market equilibrium
without the need for exchange-rate changes. In contrast, nontraded goods
make national consumption responses to asymmetric real shocks asymmet-
ric themselves. In that case, optimal monetary policy requires a relatively
greater monetary stimulus in the country experiencing the shock, and very
possibly, a change in the international nominal interest-rate di⁄erential and
in the exchange rate.
These results may strike the reader as abstract, but they are at the crux
of monetary policy decisions and institutions with ￿rst-order impacts on
peoples￿welfare. Guillermo Calvo has time and again uncovered the con-
nections between the seemingly abstruse theorem and the strikingly relevant
policy conclusion. As John Maynard Keynes famously put it, ￿The master-
economist . . . must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher. .
. . He must understand symbols and speak in words. . . . He must study
the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future.￿Even by
Keynes￿ s exacting standard, Calvo easily quali￿es as one of the great master
economists of our day.
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